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Summary 
Dominant  development  policy  approaches  recommend  women’s  employment  on  the 
grounds that it facilitates their well-being. However, empirical work on the relationship 
between  women’s  employment  status  and  well-being  as  measured  by  freedom  from 
marital violence yields ambiguous results. Motivated by the ambiguity, this paper uses 
data from Uttar Pradesh, to examine the effect of women’s employment and asset status 
as measured by their participation in paid work and house ownership, respectively, on 
spousal  violence.  Unlike  the  existing  literature,  we  treat  women’s  work  status  as 
endogenous and find that engagement in paid work and house ownership, are associated 
with reductions in violence.     
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1. INTRODUCTION
Historical  organization  of  public  and  private  spaces  naturally  associates  women  with 
private  sphere  and  domesticity,  and  thus  home  is  perceived  as  a  woman’s  domain. 
However, home is not a safe abode and around the world, women are subjected to spousal  
violence. Based on survey data, a recent multi-country study (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006)  
pegs the incidence of intimate partner inflicted physical violence at between 15 and 71 %. 
Domestic violence is recognized as a violation of the basic rights of women, and 
freedom  from  such  violence  is  an  important  aspect  of  women’s  welfare.  Domestic 
violence has severe health and social consequences for women (WHO, 2002). Various 
studies have shown (Carrillo, 1992; Heise et  al., 1994, Menon-Sen and Shiva Kumar, 
2001; Morrison and Orlando, 1999; UNICEF, 2000) the large economic and social costs 
of  domestic  violence.  Violence  or  even the  threat  of  violence  constrains  the  choices 
women make and restricts their participation in development, thus, preventing them from 
realizing their full potential (ICRW, 1999, 2000, 2002). 
Empirical evidence on violence against women in India is available from various 
sources. For instance, the National Family Health Survey III (NFHS III) conducted in 
2005-06 (IIPS and Macro International, 2007) reveals that 37 per cent of married women 
in  India  have  experienced  physical  or  sexual  violence.  According  to  a  multi-site 
household survey conducted by the International Center for Research on Women, 52 per 
cent of women have suffered at least one incident of physical or psychological violence in 
their lifetime (ICRW, 2000). 
Beyond the incidence of violence, there is a small but growing body of literature 
which  uses  information  from  various  parts  of  India  and  elsewhere  to  examine  the 
empirical  link between domestic  violence and various socio-economic attributes.  One 
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strand of the literature focuses on the link between domestic violence (women’s welfare) 
and dowry. Examples include, Bloch and Rao (2002) and Srinivasan and Bedi (2007) for 
India, Naved and Persson (2005) for Bangladesh and Zhang and Chan (1999) for Taiwan. 
A second  strand  examines  the  links  between  domestic  violence  and  women’s 
involvement  in  income generating  activities  as  captured  by  a  woman’s  earnings  and 
participation  in  paid  employment,  and  between  violence  and  women’s  ownership  of 
economic  assets  (gold  and  property).  Theoretically,  the  effect  of  a  woman’s  intra-
household economic status on violence is ambiguous. While an increase in household 
economic resources attributable to a woman may reduce economic stress and spousal 
violence, it may also introduce additional tension and struggle within a household. In an 
effort to maintain the status quo, the increased economic strength of a woman may be 
countered  by  an  increase  in  violence.  Consistent  with  this  ambiguity,  the  existing 
empirical evidence on the link between a woman’s involvement  in income generating 
activities and violence is not clear-cut.1  In the Indian context, Rao’s (1997) study on a 
community in Karnataka shows that a wife’s income is associated with reduced lifetime 
violence. With regard to women’s employment, Jejeebhoy (1998) finds that a woman’s 
employment in wage work has no statistically significant impact on the probability of 
experiencing violence in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, while based on NFHS II, Kishor 
and Johnson (2004) report that, as compared to non-working women, women being paid 
in  cash were  more likely  to  have experienced lifetime physical  violence.  In contrast, 
Panda and Agarwal (2005) report  that in Kerala,  women with regular employment as 
compared to unemployed women, were far less likely to have ever experienced violence. 
Beyond employment status, Panda and Agarwal’s (2005) innovative study uses women’s 
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ownership  of  property  (land  and  house)  to  capture  economic  status  and  finds  that 
women’s ownership of property is associated with a sharp reduction in domestic violence.
An empirical  concern which  has  rarely  been addressed  in  the  literature  is  the 
endogeneity between a woman’s economic status (employment, income) and violence.2 
For instance, as is the key concern in the developed country literature (see Staggs and 
Riger,  2005; Tolman and Wang, 2005), violence may inhibit  women’s participation in 
employment  or  women  who  experience  violence  may  be  more  likely  to  seek  paid 
employment.  If  women  who  experience  violence  are  more  likely  to  seek  paid 
employment, then estimates that do not account for this possibility are likely to draw the 
misleading conclusion that women with higher earnings or those engaged in paid work 
are more likely to experience violence.        
Our paper belongs to the genre of work that examines the link between women’s 
employment  status  and  ownership  of  economic  assets  on  domestic  violence.   In 
particular, based on qualitative and quantitative primary data collected from eight villages 
of Kaushambi district in Uttar Pradesh, a northern Indian state, this paper examines the 
link between women’s participation in paid work and women’s ownership of a house on 
domestic violence. While there are other papers that have examined such links, this paper 
offers several relatively novel features. First, unlike other papers which are usually based 
only on responses from females,  this paper draws its insights from the testimonies of 
women  and men.  Information from both women and men allows us to compare the 
reasons both sexes provide for the use of violence and allows us to gauge the extent to 
which violence may be under-reported. Second, we attempt to control for the potentially 
endogenous  relationship  between  women’s  engagement  in  paid  work  and  spousal 
violence. Third, while there are a number of papers that have examined the link between 
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women’s  income/employment  and  violence,  the  link  between  women’s  property 
ownership and violence is restricted to Panda and Agarwal (2005). Their paper on the 
effect of women’s ownership of property on violence is based on Kerala, a south Indian 
state where a substantial proportion of the population follows a matrilineal system and 
where women enjoy relatively more autonomy and freedom of movement, as compared 
to the north. In contrast, this paper examines whether the violence-reducing effects of 
house ownership also prevail in a north Indian state which has a strong patrilineal system 
and where women enjoy relatively less autonomy.    
The following section of the paper provides a brief description of the study area 
and the data. Section 3 discusses female employment patterns and spousal violence in the 
study  area.  Section  4  outlines  the  empirical  specification.  Section  5  discusses  the 
econometric estimates and section 6 concludes.
2. THE CONTEXT AND THE DATA
The paper is based on information from Kaushambi, a relatively less developed district in 
Uttar Pradesh (henceforth UP), a northern Indian state. According to Census 2001 data, 
Kaushambi has a high degree of illiteracy (70 % amongst women and 38 % amongst 
men, as compared to corresponding state-level averages of 58 % and 31 %, respectively), 
and a high infant mortality rate (94 per 1000 live births as compared to 84 per 1000 for 
the state).3 
Hindus constitute  the  majority of  the  state’s  population  (about  85 %) and the 
social order in the state is based on the caste system amongst the Hindus. As in other 
North Indian states, gender relations are driven by patriarchal socio-cultural norms which 
are,  as  noted  by  Agarwal  (1988,  p.92),  ‘characterized  by  lower  female  labour 
participation (and higher gender disparities in participation), a higher incidence of dowry, 
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greater  intra-household  discrimination  against  female  children,  and  lower  female  (to 
male) survival chances than the southern states’. 
Empirical confirmation of the nature of gender disparities comes from various 
sources. For instance, 2001 census figures show that female labor force participation rate 
is  29  %  in  Uttar  Pradesh  as  compared  to  45  %  in  the  Southern  states  (Planning 
Commission, 2002). Dowry differences across regions also reflect the asymmetric gender 
relations and a recent study by Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) reports that dowries are 
about thirty five % higher in Uttar Pradesh (north India) than in Karnataka (south India).4 
The lower chances of female survival are reflected in the state’s female life expectancy of 
59.3, over the period 2001-2005) which may be compared to the average female life-
expectancy of 66.3 in the four southern states.5
The data used in this paper were collected in 2006 and the data collection process 
was designed to deal with two issues. First, to examine the role of women’s economic 
status (as captured by their participation in paid employment and house ownership) on 
domestic violence and the effect of women’s work participation on the health of their 
children (in the age group zero to five). Given these aims, Kaushambi district was chosen 
as it has a relatively high rate of female work participation as compared to the rest of the 
state.6 In order to explore caste and class variations within Kaushambi district, data was 
gathered from eight multi-religious and multi-caste villages. 
A variety  of  data  collection  methods  was used.  In  terms  of  sequencing,  after 
village selection, an entry meeting in the form of an interview was undertaken with the 
village  Pradhan (head).  Thereafter,  eight  focus group discussions were conducted.  To 
encourage open discussion the groups were segregated along gender lines and there were 
four all male and four all female groups. Among other topics, these discussions dealt with 
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attitudes towards women’s work participation. On the basis of these discussions the semi-
structured survey instrument was amended and a pilot survey was conducted, after which 
the survey was canvassed. 
The survey was fielded in 155 households, that is, about 20 households from each 
of the eight villages.7 Given the aims of the study, the target population was defined as 
complete pair households, that is, both husband and wife are alive and living in the same 
physical  space,  with  at  least  one  child  in  the  age  group  zero  to  five.8  Households 
satisfying these criteria were further sub-divided into those in which women participated 
regularly in paid work (that is,  women who worked more than six months during the 
year) and those in which women did not engage regularly in paid work. About half the 
respondents were randomly chosen from each of these two groups. At the household level 
both  husbands  and  wives  were  canvassed.   The  survey  gathered  a  wide  range  of 
information on issues such as educational and employment status, economic status and 
ownership of assets, intra-household allocation of resources and household violence.   
Given  the  purposive  manner  in  which  the  sample  data  have  been  gathered, 
focusing on complete pair households, and the relatively small sample, it should be clear 
that our aim is not to generalize our findings for women in the state or even the district.  9 
Rather, the aim is to examine whether in the particular context of a poor North Indian 
rural setting, characterized by a patrilineal system and relatively low status of women, 
whether a woman’s work status has a bearing on her welfare.10 
III. FEMALE EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Based on focus  group discussions  with  men and women and responses  to  structured 
questionnaires,  this  section  provides  an  account  of  female  employment  status, 
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characterizes domestic violence and subsequently explores the expected effects of several 
socio-economic variables on violence.
(a) Female employment and attitude towards working women
Consistent with the research design, as displayed in Table 1, about half the women 
in the sample are engaged in paid work. About 43 % are working regularly as agricultural 
laborers (at least six months of the year) while six percent are engaged in non-agricultural 
occupations.11  
[Table 1 here]
[Table 2 here]
Female  work patterns  differ  remarkably  across  castes,  with work participation 
rates  varying  from  82  %  amongst  the  lower  castes  to  only  27  %  amongst  women 
belonging to the general  caste  group (see  Table 2).  Amongst  Hindu lower castes and 
Muslim  households,  women’s  work  force  participation  is  poverty-driven  and  women 
reported that children’s well-being was the primary motivation driving their decision to 
seek paid employment. Given their lack of assets and the limited earning capabilities of 
their husbands, they reported that they had no choice but to work. The general sentiment 
may be captured by a statement made by a female lower-caste agricultural wage laborer,
If we do not work who will feed our kids?
A majority, about 76%, of husbands (87% if wife worked and 65% if wife was not 
working)  supported  work  participation  of  their  wives  and  pointed  out  that  the  main 
benefit  was  that  their  economic  contribution  would  allow  them  to  share  household 
expenses and reduce the burden on husbands.12 For example, according to the husband of 
a lower-caste agricultural wage labourer, 
Her earning contributes to family income and she can also fulfill  some of her  
wishes, which I am not able to fulfill.
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A similar sentiment comes from the husband of an upper-caste woman engaged in a non-
agricultural government job,
She is in a government job, so if my business does not run well she will be able to  
support the family with her stable income. She will be able to bring up our kids in  
a better manner.
For a few husbands the economic contribution of their wives was not important, 
and they felt that women should work as they need to be occupied. As a husband of a 
lower-caste wage labourer commented, 
Women waste their time on idle gossip and quarreling with each other. So they 
should utilize their time and earn some money. 
While the overall impression gathered from the focus groups, conversations and 
responses to the structured questions was that women’s economic contribution is valued, 
responses from the focus group discussion to questions on the effect of women’s work on 
their status were not as positive. According to a lower caste unemployed husband,
Women’s participation in low wage work does not improve their self-worth, as  
they earn a paltry sum and their income does not make any change in their intra-
household status.
Working women’s self-perception varied across caste/class. Upper caste women 
engaged in the service sector felt  that  their economic contribution was acknowledged 
within the family and it enhanced their self-respect.13 
While a majority of husbands valued the work contribution of their wives, at the 
same  time  a  majority  (about  76%)  also  pointed  out  that  there  were  disadvantages. 
Specifically, amongst husbands expressing reservations, 60% pointed out that women’s 
work  participation  would  affect  the  upbringing  of  children  and  their  physical  and 
cognitive  development.14 Other  concerns  were  the  negative  health  consequences 
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(tiredness)  of  work  on  their  wives,  which  would  reduce  their  ability  to  carry  out 
household chores and compel their husbands to contribute to household work. 
(b) Domestic violence – A characterization
The boundaries of the relationship between the perpetrator and the abused, the 
norms of acceptable behaviour and specific acts constituting violence are crucial elements  
in  defining  domestic  violence.15 Here  we restrict  ourselves  to  the  incidence  of  inter-
spousal physical violence that has taken place anytime during the course of a marriage.16 
[Table 3 here]
[Table 4 here]
The  information  collected  from the  study  villages  shows  that  while  there  are 
instances  of  other  family  members  inflicting  violence  on  the  respondent  (wife),  the 
husband is the primary assailant. Based on the responses of wives, 52 % of them have 
experienced physical violence during the course of their marriage. 17 In terms of husbands’ 
responses, while fewer men were willing to respond to this question, about 59 % of those 
who did respond mentioned that they had beaten their wives.18  There is a high degree of 
consistency in the responses of husbands and wives and both provide the same response 
in  78  % of  the  cases.   Assuming that  both  husbands  and wives  have  a  tendency to 
underreport violence, the figures in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that men are far more likely to 
underreport as compared to women. In 16 out of 44 cases men who indicated using no 
violence  are  contradicted  by  their  wives  while  only  8  of  65  women contradict  their 
husband’s  claims  of  using  violence.  While  there  is  underreporting,  the  consistent 
responses across men and women and the fairly limited degree of the underreporting 
supports the idea that these data on a sensitive issue such as domestic violence are not 
unduly influenced by measurement error.  
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[Table 5 here]
The survey and discussions reveal that there are a variety of factors that trigger 
physical violence and there are sharp differences in the motives for inflicting violence as 
reported by husbands and wives (see Table 5). As far as husbands are concerned, the most 
common reason for using violence is a need to discipline women if they challenge male 
authority  and/or  if  they  do not  perform tasks  as  expected.  About  73  % of  husbands 
admitted  using  violence  when  women  were  “disobedient,”  that  is,  when  women 
questioned  or  objected  to  their  behaviour  (gambling,  drinking),  did  not  follow  their 
instructions,  and confronted mother-in-laws.   About  46 % of husbands used  violence 
when household tasks were not properly performed by their wives (for example, food was 
not cooked properly and on time, clothes were not washed or children were not taken care 
of) and 11 % mentioned the use of violence when women crossed a “private boundary” - 
by  talking  to  other  women,  not  observing  purdah or  meeting  relatives  without  a 
husband’s permission.  
While a similar percentage of women (46 %) support the idea that violence in the 
form of punishment for neglecting housework triggers violence, the responses provided 
by women yields a different picture.  The key differences are the larger proportion of 
women who point out that violence (and drinking) is used by men as a way of releasing 
stress, anger and frustration.  According to about 31 % of the women, men’s failure as a 
provider and their injured masculinity fuels violence and that wife beating is an outlet for 
the economic and social stress that they experience. 
In the sample, the use of violence was justified by about half the women (50 %) 
and a majority of men (80 %). While female justification of wife-beating is not unusual in  
the Indian context, the interesting aspect of these numbers is that the percentage is ‘only’ 
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about 50 %. This figure may be contrasted with a justification rate of 74% amongst a 
sample of women from Uttar Pradesh in 1993-94 as reported in Jejeebhoy (1998). While 
half  the  women  mentioned  that  violence  was  justified  at  times  and  under  certain 
circumstances, a similar percentage vociferously condemned the practice. 
(c) Domestic violence and socio-economic correlates
Drawing  on  the  characterization  provided  above,  the  following  sub-section 
provides  a discussion of the expected effects  of the main variables of interest  on the 
incidence of violence. 
(i) Income and employment
Based on the idea of economic stress as a source of violence it may be expected 
that an expansion of household economic resources, for example, due to an increase in 
income or an increase in land holding should ease economic stress and in turn reduce 
violence. In particular, since agricultural land is the key income generating asset in the 
village, an increase in access to land should be associated with a decline in violence.  
While an increase in overall economic resources should relieve the stress experienced by 
a husband, the source of the increased resources probably plays a key role in determining 
the  relative  welfare  of  the  members  of  the  household.   An increase in  the economic 
resources of the household, attributable to the husband, may unambiguously be expected 
to reduce economic stress and in turn to a reduction in violence. A husband’s improved 
employment prospects should exert a similar effect. In contrast, an increase in household 
economic resources attributable to the wife may be expected to have an ambiguous effect 
on violence.  While an increase in earnings reduces economic stress it may also introduce 
additional tension and struggle within the household.  In an effort to extract and control 
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the increased income and to counter the threat to the image of the male bread winner a 
man may resort to violence. 
The  divorce-threat  models  presented  by  Farmer  and  Tiefenthaler  (1997)  and 
Zhang and Chan (1999) predict that an increase in a woman’s income will unambiguously 
decrease the level of violence/increase welfare in intact marriages through its effect on 
raising her threat point. Additionally, the separate-spheres bargaining models presented 
by Lundberg and Pollack (1993) and Suen, Chan and Zhang (2003) show that even when 
divorce is not an option an increase in a woman’s income increases her welfare. Unlike 
these models, our characterization of violence combined with the context under scrutiny 
suggests that the effect will be ambiguous. 
The divorce-threat models are unlikely to apply in the current context. In much of 
rural India it is not easy for a woman to leave a marriage.  Even if a woman can support  
herself financially and live on her own, leaving a husband is likely to invite strong social 
disapproval. Whitehead in her study (1981:109) on the conjugal contract points out that 
‘the  relative  power  of  husbands  and  wives  does  not  simply  reflect  relative  wages 
commanded in the labour market’. Regardless of their employment and income prospects, 
familial ideologies about roles and responsibilities, of society’s expectations, may often 
lead women to continue in a marriage. Kabeer (2000, p. 52) notes that, when the ideology 
of ‘togetherness’ is the primary organizing principle in a society, women invest time and 
energy to keep their marriage alive, seeking separation only in extreme circumstances. 
Apart from the social stigma of divorce, even if credible, the need for male protection 
may also prevent women from exiting a marriage.  Men’s traditional role as a “protector” 
is still likely to prevail in the current context, even if women engaged in paid work do not 
need them as “providers”.
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Even if divorce is not an option, as in the separates-spheres bargaining models, 
and  an  increase  in  a  woman’s  earnings  increases  her  welfare  in  terms  of  increased 
consumption and leads to a “clearer perception of her individuality and well being” (Sen 
1990, p. 144), this may not always translate into reduced violence.19   Given the use of 
violence as a way of retaining control it is quite possible that an increase in consumption 
induced by an increase in women’s income is accompanied by additional control-induced 
violence.   This is similar to the possibly ambiguous effects of income on violence as 
proposed by Tauchen et al. (1991).  Based on a non-cooperative family model Tauchen et 
al. (1991) point out that, if a man’s marginal utility of violence were increasing with a 
woman’s consumption then he may allow her greater consumption but also inflict more 
violence, as her income increases. 
(ii) Wealth and education
Paralleling the discussion above, while an expansion of household wealth in the 
form of greater ownership of gold and ownership of a dwelling should reduce economic 
stress  and  violence,  the  ownership  of  such  assets  is  likely  to  play  a  key  role  in 
determining relative welfare of the husband and wife.  An increase in assets which are 
owned by a husband and under his control may unambiguously be expected to lead to a 
reduction in violence. An increase in assets owned by a wife, while reducing household 
economic stress, may have an ambiguous effect. While ownership of an asset such as a 
house  may provide  a  credible  exit  option from a  marriage  (as  argued by Panda and 
Agarwal, 2005), and provide a shield for women, it may induce additional control-fuelled 
marital violence.20  
The  predicted  effects  of  education  on  domestic  violence  are  similar  to  the 
differential patterns expected for an increase in the incomes of the husband and wife. 
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While an increase in husband’s education through its effect on income and reinforced 
through its effect on his social standing may be expected to reduce violence, the effect of 
women’s education on violence may be different.  To the extent that a woman’s education 
is associated with income increases it should reduce violence. However, her education 
and awareness may also be a source of social stress for the man as it may challenge the 
traditional male image.  In order to assert his authority, he may resort to violence.       
(iii) Excessive alcohol consumption 
In  response  to  questions  on  the  reasons  for  violence,  several  respondents 
mentioned that their husbands resort to violence when they are drunk.  It is likely that the 
same observed and unobserved factors that create economic and social stress and lead a 
man to inflict violence are likely to drive excessive alcohol consumption. This suggests 
that drunkenness should not be treated as an exogenous variable but as an outcome of the 
same  factors  that  may  drive  a  man’s  violent  actions.   This  view is  corroborated  by 
extensive reviews of the literature. These reviews confirm a strong association between 
excessive alcohol consumption and violence but point out that alcohol typically triggers 
violent behavior mainly in interaction with a number of other factors, ranging from socio-
economic, cultural to psychological and biochemical. These reports conclude that while 
alcohol abuse may spark violent behavior and serve as a catalyst, it is a symptom and not 
a cause of aggressive behaviour (The Amsterdam Group Report 2001).21 
4. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The  hypotheses  outlined  above are  testable  and this  section outlines  a  framework  to 
subject our expectations to empirical scrutiny.  Let V, a dichotomous variable, denote the 
presence  of  physical  violence  in  the  household.  V may  be  treated  as  a  function  of 
variables  capturing  the  overall  economic  position  of  the  household  (XE),  a  husband’s 
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socio-economic characteristics (XH), a wife’s socio-economic characteristics (XW), and a 
vector of additional explanatory variables (XO).  Thus, violence may be represented as, 
εββββ ++++= OOWWHHEE XXXXV . (1)
The βs are coefficients to be estimated and ε represents unobserved factors. Based on the 
assumption that ε follows a normal distribution this equation may be estimated as a probit 
model.   
In operational terms, V captures the incidence of inter-spousal physical violence. 
The overall economic position of the household is captured by the amount of land owned, 
the quality of their house (kuchha-weak or pucca-strong), and the amount of gold. The 
husband’s  socio-economic  characteristics  include  his  occupation  (self-employed  in 
agriculture,  agricultural  wage  labour,  employed  in  non-agricultural  activities),  annual 
income, years of education, age and whether he drinks. The wife’s characteristics include 
whether  she is  involved in  paid work (wage labourer,  non-agricultural  activities),  her 
annual income, years of education, age, and whether she owns the family house. Other 
variables  included  in  the  specification  indicate  number of  male  and female  children, 
caste, religion and type of marital family (joint or nuclear). We estimate several variants 
of  (1)  to  examine  the  sensitivity  of  the  key  economic  status  variables  (women’s 
employment status and house ownership) to changes in model specification.     
A key concern is the potential endogeneity between a woman’s working status and 
violence.  This possibility suggests that in equation (1), work status may be positively 
correlated with the error term and single-equation estimates of the effect of work status 
on violence may be upward biased reflecting the effect that women experiencing more 
violence are more likely to work.  To tackle this issue we use two strategies. First, we 
control for a number of observed variables which are likely to influence both violence 
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and women’s work participation. Second, and more formally, we endogenize woman’s 
work status and estimate a two-equation violence and work status model. Specifically, 
woman’s work status (engaged in paid work outside the home) denoted by (Ww) is treated 
as a function of a vector of explanatory variables (X2), that is, 
νδ += 2XWw . (2)
The vector X2 contains several variables that overlap with the variables in (1) but it also 
contains variables that determine work status but are assumed not to have a bearing on 
violence. Assuming that the error term in (2) is normally distributed, equations (1) and (2)  
are estimated simultaneously using a bivariate probit model.   
While  model  estimation  is  straightforward,  a  key  issue  in  such  procedures  is 
identification and the validity of exclusion restrictions.   In the current  case,  there are 
some natural candidates that may serve as instruments.  For instance, caste captures a 
family’s  economic  and social  standing  and is  a  crucial  variable  in  determining work 
status.  The caste of a family should be strongly correlated with work status but should 
not  have  a  bearing  on  violence,  after  controlling  for  the  economic  resources  of  a 
household.22  Additionally, as pointed out in Section 3a, presence of young children and 
type and size of family are likely to influence women’s work participation but may not 
have a direct  bearing on violence.   In our empirical work we test  the validity  of the 
exclusion restrictions and the strength of the instruments.  
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
(a) Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are provided in Table 6.  Some 
of the salient features of these data are discussed below.  The average land holding is 3.95 
bighas or about two and a half acres, and about 37 % of households do not own any land. 
19
Conditional  on owning land, the average land holding is  6.19  bighas.   Husbands are 
typically more educated than wives (6 years versus 3 years) and about 68 % of women 
are illiterate while the corresponding figure for men is 34 %. As may be expected, given 
the target population, the average couple in the sample is relatively young with a mean 
age of 32 for men and 28 for women. About nine percent of the women report that they 
own the house in which the family lives while the corresponding figure for the husband is 
60 %. For the remaining cases the dwelling is owned by the parents of the husband.  
While  female  house  ownership  is  limited,  given  the  North  Indian  context,  it  is  not 
unexpected. In fact compared with the 16 % female house ownership rate in rural Kerala 
(Panda and Agarwal, 2005) the figure here may not seem too low. The average number of 
children per household is three and a half with an equal proportion of boys and girls. 
About 23 % of the men consume alcohol.  
[Table 6 here]
(b) Domestic violence and selected characteristics
As a preview to the econometric work, Table 7 shows the bivariate relationship 
between domestic violence and some selected characteristics. The numbers suggest that 
domestic violence is negatively correlated with the economic position of the household. 
For instance, the average land holdings in households where women experience violence 
is 2.21 bighas as compared to 5.87 bighas in households where women do not experience 
violence. Similarly, the education level of husbands who do use violence is almost twice 
that of husbands who do resort to such measures (8.31 versus 4.62 years of education). 
Women who experience violence are far less educated than those who do not (1.65 versus 
4.24 years of education).  
[Table 7 here]
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A wife’s  engagement  in  wage  work  appears  to  be  associated  with  increased 
violence. The incidence of paid work amongst women experiencing violence is 56 % as 
compared to 42 % amongst who do not experience violence. While the higher proportion 
of working women amongst those who experience violence should not be construed as 
the effect of work on violence, as women from poorer households and those experiencing 
more  violence  maybe  more  likely  to  work,  the  figures  highlight  the  importance  of 
endogenizing work participation. It is interesting to note that consistent with the literature 
from other developing countries,  as reviewed in Vyas and Watts (2008),  the bivariate 
analysis presented here shows that women’s access to income is associated with a higher 
lifetime history of physical violence. A wife’s ownership of a house is associated with a 
sharp reduction in violence.  Female household ownership is about 16 % amongst those 
who do not experience violence as compared to two percent amongst those who do.       
(c) Single equation probit estimates
Table  8  presents  estimates  of  several  probit  specifications  of  the  violence 
equation.  Following the narrative provided in the earlier sections, the discussion focuses 
on the role of household economic resources, and the socio-economic characteristics of 
the husband and wife in influencing the probability of experiencing violence. 
[Table 8 here]
We  begin  with  what  may  be  termed  a  “canonical”  specification  (Table  8, 
specification  1),  variants  of  which  have  been estimated  in  other  studies  on domestic 
violence (for example, see Aekplakorn and Kongsakon, 2007; Flake, 2005; Jejeebhoy, 
1998; Hindin and Adair,  2002; Naved and Persson, 2005; Rao, 1997).23 The common 
feature of this specification is that it does not control for husband’s occupational status. 
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Based on this  specification  we may draw the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  association 
between a woman’s work status and violence. 
Table 8, specification 2, includes controls for the occupational status of husbands 
and as shown there is a sharp change in the coefficient on women’s work status.24 The 
effect is now statistically significant at conventional levels and the coefficient indicates 
that women engaged in paid work outside the household are about 21 percentage points 
less likely to experience violence as compared to women who do not work or work on the 
family farm. The sharp change in the absolute value of the coefficient indicates that in the 
absence of controls for husband’s occupational status the coefficient on women’s work 
status  will  be  upward  biased  (more  positive  than it  should  be)  and may  lead  to  the 
misleading conclusion that there is a positive link between violence and work. To probe 
the effect of female work we split the work status variable into three different categories, 
that is working outside the home as an agricultural labourer, working in non-agricultural 
occupations and working on the family farm. As the estimates (Table 8, specification 3 to 
5)  show,  the  protective  effect  of  women’s  employment  on  violence,  a  reduction  of 
between 24 to 29 percentage points, comes mainly from women working as agricultural 
wage  labourers  (regular  employment  for  at  least  six  months  a  year).  The  effect  of 
working in non-agricultural activities is not statistically significant, probably due to the 
small number of women engaged in such work. The interesting aspect is that working on 
the family farm does not offer any protection. 
 As  far  as  the  other  key  variable  of  interest  -  female  house  ownership  -  is 
concerned, consistent with the findings of Panda and Agarwal (2005), there is a clear link 
between this variable and violence. Across all specifications, women’s house ownership 
(as  opposed  to  ownership  by  other  family  members)  is  associated  with  a  33  to  36 
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percentage point reduction in violence.25 This is a large effect. However, it is possible, 
given the context, that women who do own a house are exceptional in some way and 
ignoring  this  aspect  may  lead  to  an  exaggeration  of  the  protective  effect  of  house 
ownership. We return to this issue later in the text. 
Turning briefly to the other variables we see that consistent with the bulk of the 
literature the amount of land owned by a household is negatively linked to violence but 
the  effect  is  not  statistically  significant.  Similarly,  the  estimates  show  that  families 
residing in a  pucca as opposed to a  kuccha house are 17 to 25 percentage points less 
likely to experience violence, but the effect is not very precisely measured. The effect of 
husband’s  occupation  is  large  and  shows  that  husbands  who  are  self-employed  in 
agriculture (the highest income category) are 32 to 37 percentage points less likely to 
inflict violence as compared to husbands involved in non-agricultural occupations.26 
A one year increase in a man’s education is associated with a 2.5 to 2.9 percentage 
point reduction in violence. While a woman’s education also exerts a negative effect, it is 
not  statistically  significant.27 Education  may  exert  an  effect  on  violence  due  to  the 
correlation between education and income but it is also likely to have a direct effect on 
violence, regardless of the income effect.28 
The  number  of  sons,  daughters  and  type  of  family  are  not  associated  with 
violence. In section 4, we argued that after controlling for household economic resources, 
caste should not have a bearing on domestic violence. To examine this empirically, Table 
8, specification 5 includes a set of caste and religion dummies.  The caste variables do not  
exert  an  effect  on  violence.  The  religion  dummy is  also  statistically  insignificant  at 
conventional levels (although the  p-value is close to 10 %). Jointly the set of variables 
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that  capture  family  composition,  family  type  and  caste  are  jointly  statistically 
insignificant (p-values ranging from 0.30 to 0.35). 
Finally,  while  alcohol  consumption  certainly  appears  to  trigger  violence  (see 
Table 7), it  is likely that domestic violence and alcohol consumption are endogenous. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of conducting a sensitivity analysis we include an indicator of 
the drinking habits of husbands in our estimated models (Table A1, specification 6).  As 
may  be  expected  there  is  a  large  and  statistically  significant  effect  of  drinking  on 
violence.   However, regardless of the inclusion of this variable,  the magnitude of the 
coefficient on work status and women’s house ownership, remains in the same range as 
observed in our baseline specifications (Table 8, specifications 2 and 3).
(d) Bivariate probit estimates
To account for the endogeneity of a woman’s work status,  equations (1) and (2) 
are estimated simultaneously.  Maximum likelihood estimates of three different bivariate 
probit  specifications  are  presented  in  Table  9.  In  addition,  instrumental  variable 
regression estimates (that is, estimating equations 1 and 2 using OLS) are presented in 
Table A2 (specification 2). Although not entirely appropriate, as the dependent variables 
are discrete, we use an instrumental variables model as this approach allows us to apply 
specification tests to examine the strength and validity of the instruments.
[Table 9 here]
The work status equation presented in specification 1 is identified on the basis of 
family composition and type while estimates in specification 2 are identified on the basis 
of family composition, family type and caste variables and specification 3 uses only the 
caste variables to aid identification.  Focusing on specification 2 we see that belonging to 
a scheduled caste sharply increases the probability of working while as shown earlier, 
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caste does not have an influence on domestic violence (see Table 8, column 6). Based on 
an IV specification (see Table A2), formal statistical tests show that the instruments are 
correlated with a woman’s work status. An F-test for excluding the instruments records a 
p-value  of  0.059 and the  partial  R-squared  of  the  excluded instruments  is  0.083.  To 
examine  the  validity  of  the  instruments  we  carried  out  a  test  for  overidentifying 
restrictions. The test statistic has a p-value of 0.418, that is, the test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between some of the instruments and the error term in 
the violence equation.29    
Turning to  the  estimates,  a  glance  shows that  for  the  most  part,  they are not 
sensitive to the variable set used for identification (compare Table 9, specs. 1, 2 and 3) 
nor are they sensitive to the estimation method (compare Table 9 estimates and Table A2, 
specification 2).  Focusing on the violence estimates we see that the story emerging from 
the bivariate probit specifications is similar to that from the single-equation estimates. 
Husband’s  education  continues  to  be  associated  with  a  reduction  in  violence  and 
husband’s engaged in more remunerative occupations are less likely to use violence. The 
effect  of  women’s  house  ownership  is  somewhat  smaller  than  the  single-equation 
estimates, but it remains statistically significant and continues to exert a protective effect. 
Given the limited female house ownership it is possible that women who do own a house 
are in some way exceptional. In order to isolate a “cleaner” ownership effect we estimate 
an  additional  bivariate  probit  specification  which  controls  for  caste  and  block  fixed 
effects. The ownership effect is smaller as compared to estimates in Table 8 and 9 and not 
as precisely estimated although still  statistically significant at conventional levels (see 
Table A2, specification 1). 
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The effect of a woman’s work status also exerts a protective effect but is much 
larger as compared to the single equation estimates. These estimates indicate that women 
engaged in regular paid work outside the household are 62 to 64 percentage points less 
likely  to  experience  violence  as  compared  to  non-working  women.  The  jump in  the 
magnitude of this  coefficient  supports  the idea  that it  is  important  to account  for the 
endogeneity of a woman’s working status. While a doubling of the coefficient may seem 
large it is not unusual. For example, in their study of low-income women in the United 
States,  Gibson-Davies  et  al.  (2005)  show that  estimates  that  do  not  account  for  the 
endogeneity between domestic violence and employment grossly overestimate the effect 
of women’s employment status on abuse. According to their estimates, single-equation 
probit estimates reveal a zero or even a positive relationship between employment and 
abuse,  while  their  instrumental  variable  probit  estimates  show  that  for  all  types  of 
violence,  employment  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  violence  of  between  4  to  8 
percentage points (that is, an infinite increase in the magnitude of the employment status 
coefficients between the probit  and instrumental variable  probit  estimates).  The sharp 
change increase between the bivariate and single equation probit estimates supports the 
idea that at the very least,  women’s engagement in regular paid agricultural  work (as 
compared to women who do not work for wages or are self-employed on the family farm) 
reduces the incidence of violence by 24 to 29 percentage points (Table 8).  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
On the basis of a micro-level village study this paper explored the link between 
the  effect  of  women’s  ownership  of  their  household  dwelling  and the  effect  of  their 
regular  employment  in  paid  work  on  intra-spousal  violence.  The  study  showed  that 
women’s  employment  in  such  work  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  violence. 
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Methodologically, this paper displays that it is important to treat female work status as 
endogenous. Estimates that do not account for the possibility that violence may motivate 
a woman to seek work, are more likely to draw the misleading conclusion that women’s 
work status is associated with an increase in violence.  The results  presented here are 
based on a small sample,  and while  robust,  their wider applicability still  needs to be 
established.           
In addition to the work effect, across all specifications we found that women’s 
ownership  of  a  house  has  a  violence  reducing  effect.  This  is  similar  to  Panda  and 
Agarwal’s (2005) finding for Kerala. A similar result in a very different context suggests 
the  wider  implications  of  their  view that women’s ownership of property increases a 
woman’s economic security, reduces her willingness to tolerate violence and by providing 
a credible exit option works towards deterring spousal violence.  
Overall,  the  results  presented  in  this  paper  suggest  that  women’s  access  to 
income-generating opportunities and control over assets play a key role in reducing their 
vulnerability  to  violence.  Policies  which  encourage  income-generation  and  greater 
involvement of women in regular paid work outside their homes and help women build 
and retain control over assets are necessary in order to increase their security.     
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1 NOTES
 In a recent survey of the link between marital violence and women’s involvement in income generation in 
developing countries, Vyas and Watts (2008) report that women’s involvement in such activities is generally associated 
with a higher lifetime history of physical violence, although in three of the 20 sites the authors reported a statistically 
significant protective association and in five there was no association. Based on studies from 22 sites which examined  
the link between women’s involvement in income generation and physical violence in the past year, the authors report 
that five recorded a protective association, six recorded a greater risk, while the rest did not find any association.   
2 Rao (1997) points out that, women’s income and violence may be endogenously determined but is unable to correct  
for this possibility due to lack of instrumental variables.  A notable exception is Gibson-Davies et al.  (2005) who use 
data  from the United States  and present  instrumental  variable  estimates  of  the  effect  of  women’s  employment  on 
domestic violence.  
3 Although the census does not directly gather data on infant mortality, census based information has been used to  
compute  state  and  district  level  infant  mortality  rates.  The mortality  figures  provided  are  for  2001 and  are  from 
Population Foundation of India (2008).
4 Dowry differences are in monetary terms. All gifts and cash are valued at constant 1994 prices. For details see Dalmia  
and Lawrence (2005).
5 Life-expectancy data are from  (http://planningcommission.nic.in/data/datatable/Data0910/tab%2084.pdf, 2001).
6 According to data from Census 2001, the female work participation rate in rural Kaushambi is 31 % versus 19 % in  
rural Uttar Pradesh. Female work participation is higher in Kaushambi due to the district’s caste composition. Based on 
Census 2001, the Schedule Caste (SC) population of Uttar Pradesh was 21.1 % while that of Kaushambi was 36.1 %. 
Typically, and as is also evident in our data set female work participation tends to be higher amongst the schedule caste 
population.
7 Before  each  individual  interview,  respondents  were  informed  that  the  instrument  was  designed  to  collect  the 
perspectives of husbands and wives on several topics and that some of the topics would be of a personal nature. Only if  
respondents agreed did the interview proceed. Thus, informed consent was obtained. Second, husbands and wives living 
in the same household were interviewed separately and confidentially by same sex interviewers.
8 Where  ever  a  joint  family  was  selected  and  more  than  one  complete  pair  household  lived  in  the  family,  one 
woman/pair was randomly selected to be included in the survey.
9 The econometric work reported in the paper relies on a relatively small data set of 155 households. Recently published 
studies such as Rao’s (1997) work on domestic violence is based on a data set of 160 women; Bloch and Rao’s (2002)  
analysis of domestic violence is based on a sample of 137 women. Similarly, Srinivasan and Bedi (2007) rely on a  
sample of 137 to 142 women. Set against these contributions the data set that we use is not unusually small. While the 
small size has its disadvantages,  it also has the advantage of allowing coverage of a wide range of topics and the  
collection of reliable information on sensitive issues.  
10 In other words the paper is concerned mainly with internal validity – that is attempting to isolate the causal effect of  
women’s economic status on spousal violence – and not with generalization or external validity. 
11 While we also gathered information on husband and wife individual incomes, given the difficulty of gathering reliable  
income information we rely mainly on occupational status as the key variable to capture the income status of the  
household.  Occupational status is relatively easy to observe and is far less likely to be measured with error as compared  
to income. 
12 The responses were remarkably similar across caste groups with support for work participation ranging from 72 to 78 
% across caste groups.
13 Only 3 of them were working.
14 Except for the general caste group which expressed a higher rate (about 77 %) of concern about the effect of women’s  
work participation on the welfare of children the rest of the caste/religion groups expressed a similar rate of reservation  
(between 56 and 60 %). 
15 See ICRW (1999) for a discussion on definitional issues. 
16 Physical violence includes acts such as slapping, beating, arm-twisting, stabbing, strangling, kicking, burning. A focus  
on physical violence excludes emotional violence and is likely to underestimate the extent of total violence (emotional 
and physical). Data from NFHS III (IIPS and Macro International, 2007) shows that while this is indeed the case the  
extent  of  the  underestimate  is  not  large.  For example,  at  the all-India  level,  lifetime  incidence  of  physical/sexual  
violence is about 37.2 %. The inclusion of emotional violence increases this figure to 39.7 %. This underestimate of  
about 3 percentage points remains the same across wealth classes, levels of female education, and caste.   
17 The key dependent variable in our analysis is inter-spousal physical violence which has occurred any time during the  
course of the marriage. We tried to collect information on (i) whether there has ever been an incidence of spousal  
physical violence and (ii) whether there has been any spousal violence in the 12 months preceding the survey. However, 
it was difficult for respondents to distinguish between these two questions and the survey question essentially became  
(i).
18 Before canvassing the sections on violence, respondents were informed about the nature of the questions and could  
refuse to respond to the entire section or to specific questions. As the numbers show, while all 155 women provided  
information on the incidence of violence, only 81 chose to provide information on reasons for violence. For men, the 
corresponding numbers were 109 and 71.
19 Sen (1990) argues that “Outside earnings can give the woman in question a better breakdown position, possibly a  
clearer perception of her individuality and well being and a higher  ‘perceived contribution’ to the family’s economic  
position.”  This argument may still hold without necessarily translating into reduced violence.
20 Panda and Agarwal (2005) point out argue that it is not an issue of whether women actually use the exit option that  
ownership of property provides, but that the existence of such an option may be expected to deter marital violence.
21 A report prepared by The Social Issues Research Centre (1998) reaches a similar conclusion, “From the research 
evidence available, we can conclude that there is no direct causal relationship between alcohol and violence. Where the  
immediate social context is non-aggressive and where cultural beliefs and norms inhibit aggression, drinkers are highly 
unlikely to become aggressive”.
22 Support for this idea comes from various sources. In particular, a number of ICRW (1999, 2000, 2002) studies explore  
the links between caste and domestic violence.  ICRW’s study on Rajasthan reports that there is “no significant variation 
with respect to the caste of the respondent”. Similarly, ICRW’s Tamil Nadu study finds that 43 % of non-Dalit men have  
inflicted physical violence as compared to 45 % among Dalit men.  Srinivasan and Bedi’s (2007) study on Tamil Nadu 
also reports that there is no link between caste and violence after controlling for household economic status. 
23 While  there  are  wide  variations  in  the  specifications  that  are  estimated  across  these  papers,  their  common 
characteristic (as in the specification presented in Table 8, specification 1) is that they do not control for husband’s 
occupational status.  Hindin and Adair (2002) control for husband’s employment status (works for pay or not) but given  
that 92 % of the husbands in their sample work, this is not a very informative variable.  Papers that do attempt to  
account for husband’s job quality/occupation include Panda and Agarwal (2005) who control  for husband’s type of 
employment (regular and seasonal employment) while Kishor and Johnson (2004) control for husband’s occupational 
status (agriculture or non-agriculture).   
24 The key dependent variable in our analysis is inter-spousal physical violence which has occurred any time during the  
course of the marriage which we link to women’s employment status in the  last  one year.  Ideally  we should link  
women’s employment status in the last year with inter-spousal physical violence in the last year. The measure that we  
do use, lifetime physical violence is not ideal but contains useful information to support the analysis. First, lifetime  
physical violence and violence in the last 12 months are likely to be correlated. Second, the lifetime measure will  
provide a higher estimate of violence as compared to the 12 month measure and the gap between the two is likely to 
increase with the age of the respondents. Accordingly, all our estimates control for the age of the husband and wife.  
Finally, since the gap between the two measures is likely to increase with age, to provide an empirical assessment of the 
effect  of linking life-time physical  violence to  current  employment we estimated a specification where we restrict  
ourselves to women who are less than or equal to 25 years of age and compared that with our baseline estimates. As  
shown in Table A1, specification 2, even with such a sharp restriction, the effect of female work status on violence  
remains negative and statistically significant.  While a number of other variables are not as precisely estimated the  
stability of the estimates (compare specifications 1 and 2, Table A1) is remarkable and suggests that life-time physical 
violence may be a reasonable proxy for physical violence experienced in the last year.
25 We use household ownership of land and gold to capture overall household wealth. We do not have information on  
women’s  ownership  of  gold  but  do  have  information  on  women’s  ownership  of  farm  land  and  women’s  house  
ownership. We work only with women’s ownership of a house as ownership of farm land and house ownership are  
highly correlated (0.75) and house ownership captures the variation in both these variables. As a sensitivity check we  
provide an estimate where we include both women’s ownership of land and house. As a comparison of specifications 1  
and 3 in Table A1 shows, the coefficient on wife ownership of farm land is insignificant while the coefficient on house 
ownership lies in the same range as in other specifications.
26 We prefer to use occupational status indicators to capture household income as these variables are less likely to be  
plagued by measurement error. Nevertheless, we estimate a specification where we do control for the income of the  
husband and wife (Table A1, specification 5). The inclusion of these measures does not have a substantial effect on the  
estimates. 
27 Rao (1993) and Zhang and Chan (1999) estimate specifications where women’s welfare, are treated as functions of  
educational and age differences between husband and wife. As pointed out by Edlund (2000) such specifications impose 
the restriction that the attributes of husband and wife influence women’s welfare in a symmetric manner.  This may not  
be and is certainly not the case in our data and hence we treat violence as a function of individual traits rather than  
differences. 
28 As displayed in Table A1, specification 5, the coefficient on husband’s education is not influenced by the inclusion of 
the income variables displaying that the direct effect of education dominates. 
29 The estimates of the work status equation are broadly consistent with the views expressed in the FGD and show that 
women whose husband’s are engaged as wage laborers are more likely to work as are schedule caste women. 
[Table A1 here] 
[Table A2 here]
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Table 1
Male and Female Main Occupational Status
 [absolute numbers] 
MaleFemale %% Work on own/leased farm14.2
 [22]14.2
[22]Agricultural Wage Laborer52.3 
[81]43.2
[67]Non-agricultural occupations 
(own business, nurse, sewing, mason, carpenter)30.9
[48]6.45
[10]
Does not participate2.6
[4]36.1
[56]
Table 2
Female Occupational Status by Caste/Religion (%) [absolute numbers]
Hindu-GeneralHindu-OBCHindu-SCMuslimWork on own/leased farm10
[3]30
[13]5
[3]13
[3]Agricultural Wage Laborer0
[0]33
[14]74
[43]44
[10]Non-agricultural occupations 
(own business, nurse, sewing, mason, carpenter)17
[5]2
[1]
3
[2]
9
[2]Does not participate 74
[23]35
[15]17
[10]35
[8]
Table 3
Incidence of physical violence (%) [absolute numbers]
Reported by wivesReported by husbands
52.3
[81]59.6
[65]N155109
Table 4
Incidence of physical violence (% of total) [absolute numbers]
Reported by husbands
Reported by wivesYesNoNYes52.3
[57]14.7
[16]73No7.34
[8]25.7
[28]36N6544109
Table 5
 Reasons for physical violence (%)
Reported by husbandsReported by wivesDisobedience73.220.8Neglecting 
housework46.445.7Crossing the private sphere11.25.0Release for husband’s frustration/tension/anger 
0.014.8Release tension/anger under the influence of alcohol2.816.0Without any 
reason0.013.6Infidelity0.02.5N7181Note: Based on multiple responses
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics
Variable (units)MeanStd. Dev.Land owned by household (in bighas)
Condition of house – pucca (percent)
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca (percent)
Quantity of gold (in grams)
Husband’s education (in years)
Husband’s age 
Husband’s annual income in Rupees
Husband drinks (percent)
Wife’s education (in years)
Wife’s annual income in Rupees 
Wife’s age 
Wife owns house (percent)
Number of living sons
Number of living daughters
Nuclear family (percent)
Hindu – General (percent)
Hindu – Other Backward Castes (percent) 
Hindu – Scheduled Caste (percent)
Muslims (percent)3.95
23.0
22.0
4.95
6.39
32.3
17,905
23.0
2.89
2879
28.27
9.0
1.70
1.82
73.0
20.0
28.0
37.0
15.012.8
.
.
12.11
5.40
6.01
30,441
.
4.67
4260
5.26
.
1.18
1.45
.
.
.
.
.Notes: The number of observations is 155 except for the variable indicating husband’s drinking 
habits where N = 125
.Table 7
Domestic Violence and Selected Characteristics
VariableDo not experience violenceExperience violencep-valueLand owned by household (in 
bighas)
Condition of house – pucca (percent)
Husband’s education (in years)
Husband’s age 
Husband’s main activity-agricultural wage laborer (percent)
Husband’s main activity-self-employed in agriculture (percent)
Husband’s annual income in Rupees
Husband drinks (percent)
Wife’s education (in years)
Wife’s age 
Wife’s annual income in Rupees
Wife engaged in paid work outside home (percent)
Wife owns house (percent)
Number of living sons
Number of living daughters
Family type: Nuclear (percent)
Hindu – General (percent)
Hindu – Other Backward Castes (percent)
Hindu – Scheduled Caste (percent)
Muslims (percent)5.87
31
 8.31
30.8
39.1
23
22077
9
4.24
27
2593
42
16.2
1.59
1.42
64
28
27
40
42.21
14.8
4.62
33.6
64.2
6.1
14095
35
1.65
30
3141
56
2.4
1.80
2.18
81
12
28
34
250.075
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.119
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.431
0.090
0.000
0.276
0.000
0.155
0.013
0.851
0.446
0.000Notes: The last column of the table reports p-values for a two-tail t-test. The null hypothesis is 
equality of means.  The number of observations is 155 except for the variable indicating husband’s drinking 
habits where N = 125
 Table 8
Probability of Experiencing Violence – Probit Estimates
VariableMarginal effectsSpec. 1Spec. 2Spec. 3Spec. 4Spec. 5Land owned by household-0.0037-0.00080-
0.0011-0.0012-0.00056(-1.14)(-0.24)(-0.31)(-0.35)(-0.16)Condition of house – pucca-0.17-0.20-0.21-0.25**-0.22*(-
1.42)(-1.61)(-1.63)(-1.96)(-1.66)Condition of house – kuccha-pucca0.0520.00930.0130.0190.019(0.45)(0.078)(0.11)
(0.15)(0.15)Amount of gold in household0.00510.00240.00280.00210.0024(1.14)(0.51)(0.59)(0.47)(0.52)Husband’s 
education-0.025**-0.029***-0.029***-0.028**-0.026**(-2.35)(-2.66)(-2.68)(-2.44)(-2.23)Husband’s age-0.027-0.026-
0.024-0.027-0.023(-1.29)(-1.16)(-1.10)(-1.30)(-1.09)Husband’s occupation – agri. wage laborer-
0.0200.0210.0340.0080(-0.15)(0.15)(0.24)(0.053)Husband’s occupation – agri. self-employed-0.35**-0.32*-0.33*-
0.37**(-2.27)(-1.77)(-1.77)(-2.02)Wife’s education-0.021*-0.016-0.022-0.019-0.014(-1.71)(-1.22)(-1.58)(-1.35)(-
1.00)Wife’s age0.056**0.054**0.053**0.057**0.051**(2.25)(2.09)(2.03)(2.32)(2.04)Wife’s occupation – agri. wage 
laborer..-0.29**-0.29**-0.24*(-2.11)(-2.19)(-1.68)Wife’s occupation – agri. Self-employed..-0.069-0.066-0.042(-0.39)(-
0.39)(-0.23)Wife’s occupation – non-agricultural ..-0.12-0.12-0.11(-0.70)(-0.71)(-0.60)Wife engaged in paid work 
outside home-0.13-0.21*...(-1.30)(-1.95)Wife owns house-0.36**-0.35**-0.35**-0.34**-0.33*(-2.14)(-2.02)(-2.04)(-
2.01)(-1.86)Number of living sons...-0.065-0.072(-1.36)(-1.39)Number of living daughters...0.0280.023(0.63)
(0.50)Nuclear family...0.100.056(0.85)(0.46)Hindu – other backward castes....0.15(1.08)Hindu – scheduled 
caste....0.079(0.49)Muslim....0.33(1.64)Observations155155155155155Pseudo R20.2010.2270.2330.250.268Notes: 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9
Probability of Experiencing Violence and Working – Bivariate Probit Estimates
VariableMarginal  effectsSpec. 1Spec. 2Spec. 3WorkingViolenceWorking ViolenceWorking ViolenceLand  
owned by household
Condition of house – pucca
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca
Amount of gold in household
Husband’s education
Husband’s age
Husband’s occupation – agri. wage laborer
Husband’s occupation – agri. self-employed 
Wife’s education 
Wife’s age
Wife engaged in paid work outside home
Wife owns house
Number of living sons 
Number of living daughters
Nuclear family
Hindu - other backward castes = 1
Hindu - scheduled caste  = 1
Muslim = 1-0.005
(-0.52)
0.173
(1.13)
-0.035
(-0.28)
0.001
(0.25)
-0.021*
(-1.85)
0.003
(-0.13)
0.63***
(7.42)
-0.282*
(-1.77)
0.021
(1.34)
0.006
(0.23)
.
-0.054
(-0.27)
0.092**
(2.09)
-0.004
(-0.12)
-0.021
(-0.19)
.
.
.
-0.001
(-0.28)
-0.154
(-1.42)
-0.038
(-0.35)
0.002
(0.41)
 -0.033***
(-3.27)
-0.016
(-0.95)
0.295***
(2.78)
-0.389***
(-3.62)
-0.004
(-0.27)
0.043**
(-2.21)
-0.64***
(-11.79)
-0.28**
(-2.00)
.
.
.
.
.
.-0.0047
(-0.45)
0.119
(0.67)
-0.018
(-0.14)
0.0014
(0.26)
-0.038***
(-3.16)
-0.010
(-0.46)
0.606***
(5.73)
-0.244
(-1.52)
0.040**
(2.22)
0.040
(1.58)
.
-0.027
(-0.14)
0.036
(0.71)
-0.006
(-0.18)
-0.089
(-0.52)
0.025
(0.14)
0.374**
(2.01)
-0.085
(-0.39)-0.001
(-0.21)
-0.160
(-1.44)
-0.060
(-0.54)
0.002
(0.38)
-0.032***
(-3.14)
-0.015
(-0.91)
0.271**
(2.47)
-0.395***
(-3.71)
-0.004
(-0.33)
0.042**
(2.14)
-0.624***
(-11.14)
-0.286**
(-2.09)
.
.
.
.
.
.-0.0034
(-0.37)
0.052
(0.33)
-0.014
(-0.11)
0.001
(0.21)
-0.037***
(-3.33)
-0.011
(-0.56)
0.582***
(5.75)
-0.237
(-1.56)
0.042*
(2.53)
0.042**
(2.05)
.
-0.050
(-0.27)
.
.
.
0.006
(0.04)
  0.382***
(2.57)
-0.106
(-0.60)-0.001
(-0.20)
-0.153
(-1.39)
-0.060
(-0.54)
0.002
(0.41)
-0.031***
(-3.21)
-0.016
(-0.93)
0.278**
(2.61)
-0.394***
(-3.71)
-0.005
(-0.35)
0.042**
(2.22)
-0.627***
(-11.44)
-0.289**
(-2.12)
.
.
.
.
.
.Observations
Log likelihood155
-146.40155
-139.64155
-140.08Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses.  Specification 1 is based on using number of living sons,  
number of living daughters and nuclear family as instruments. In addition to those used in Specification 1, Specification 
2 relies on the caste/religion variable to achieve identification. Specification 3 relies only on the caste/religion variables  
to achieve identification.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1: Probability of Experiencing Violence – Additional Probit Estimates
VariableMarginal  effectsSpec.  1Spec.  2Spec.  3Spec.  4Spec.  5Spec.  6Land  owned  by  household 
-0.000800.0058-0.00078-0.00110.0020-0.0076*(-0.24)(0.53)(-0.23)(-0.31)(0.46)(-1.75)Condition  of  house  –pucca 
-0.20-0.16*-0.20-0.21-0.20-0.078(-1.61)(-1.75)(-1.63)(-1.63)(-1.55)(-0.53)Condition of house –  kuccha-pucca 0.0093-
0.16*0.0130.0130.0140.079(0.078)(-1.73)(0.11)(0.11)(0.11)(0.51)Amount  of  gold  in  household  0.0024-
0.0160.00240.00280.00180.0078*(0.51)(-1.17)(0.50)(0.59)(0.38)(1.70)Husband’s  education  -0.029***-0.019-
0.029***-0.029***-0.029***-0.038***(-2.66)(-1.48)(-2.65)(-2.68)(-2.69)(-2.98)Husband’s  age-0.026-0.0073-0.025-
0.024-0.027-0.026(-1.16)(-0.33)(-1.12)(-1.10)(-1.19)(-1.16)Husband’s  occupation-agri.  wage  laborer-0.0200.18-
0.0180.0210.0150.12(-0.15)(1.49)(-0.13)(0.15)(0.10)(0.76)Husband’s  occupation-agri.  self-employed-0.35**-0.18**-
0.35**-0.32*-0.31*-0.20(-2.27)(-2.23)(-2.26)(-1.77)(-1.71)(-0.76)Wife’s  education  -0.016-0.021-0.017-0.022-0.022-
0.014(-1.22)(-1.40)(-1.27)(-1.58)(-1.55)(-0.86)Wife’s  age  0.054**0.098**0.054**0.053**0.055**0.063**(2.09)(2.37)
(2.07)(2.03)(2.11)(2.53)Wife’s  occupation-agri.  wage  laborer...-0.29**-0.41**-0.35**(-2.11)(-2.43)(-2.15)Wife’s 
occupation – agri. self-employed...-0.069-0.098-0.18(-0.39)(-0.57)(-0.95)Wife’s occupation – non-agricultural...-0.12-
0.38-0.13(-0.70)(-1.53)(-0.63)Wife engaged in paid work outside home-0.21*-0.24*-0.20*...(-1.95)(-1.82)(-1.92)Wife 
owns  house  -0.35**-0.074-0.41**-0.35**-0.36**-0.38*(-2.02)(-0.59)(-2.28)(-2.04)(-2.05)(-1.73)Husband   annual 
income ....-3.1e-06.(-0.89)Wife annual income....0.000025.(1.44)Husband consumes alcohol.....0.29**(2.15)Wife owns 
farm land  ..0.13...(0.57)Observations15550155155155125Pseudo  R20.2270.090.2290.2330.2430.288Notes:  Robust 
z-statistics  in  parentheses.  Specification  1  is  the  same  specification  as  reported  in  Table  8, 
specification 2 and has been provided to aid comparisons. Specification 2 is restricted to women 
who are less than or equal to 25. Specification 3 may be compared with specification 1 and includes 
an additional regressor to control for wife’s ownership of farmland. Specification 4 is the same as  
Table 8, specification 3 and has been provided to aid comparisons. Specification 5 includes all the  
variables in specification 4 and also controls for wife and husband annual income. Specification 6 
includes all the variable in specification 4 and a variable indicating whether husband drinks.*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2: Probability of Experiencing Violence and Working  
VariableMarginal effectsBivariate 
Probit 
Spec. 1Instrumental Variable 
Spec. 2WorkingViolenceWorkingViolenceLand owned by household
Condition of house – pucca
Condition of house – kuccha-pucca
Amount of gold in household
Husband’s education
Husband’s age
Husband’s occupation – agri. wage labourer
Husband’s occupation – agri. self-employed 
Wife’s education 
Wife’s age
Wife engaged in paid work outside home
Wife owns house
Number of living sons
Number of living daughters
Nuclear family
Hindu - other backward castes = 1
Hindu - scheduled caste  = 1
Muslim = 1-0.0009
(-0.17)
0.001
(0.01)
0.014
(0.09)
0.003
(0.45)
-0.046**
(-3.73)
-0.009
(-0.41)
0.683*
(6.64)
-0.120
(-0.52)
0.047**
(2.49)
0.038
(1.35)
.
-0.086
(-0.37)
0.059
(1.07)
0.006
(0.35)
-0.135
(-0.77)
0.088
(0.42)
0.526***
(2.93)
0.031
(0.11)-0.000
(-0.01)
-0.136
(-1.11)
0.062
(0.50)
0.004
(0.83)
-0.035***
(-3.20)
-0.012
(-0.67)
0.254*
(1.91)
-0.375***
(-3.07)
-0.003
(-0.18)
0.040*
(1.85)
-0.628***
(-9.50)
-0.275*
(-1.79)
.
.
.
0.189
(1.29)
0.243
(1.55)
0.169
(0.82)-0.0003
(-0.10)
-0.023
(-0.26)
-0.052
(-0.54)
0.0007
(0.19)
-0.016**
(-2.05)
-0.0001
(-0.01)
0.442*
(4.68)
-0.167
(-1.55)
0.018
(1.78)
0.014
(0.87)
.
-0.014
(-0.12)
0.013
(0.39)
0.005
(0.17)
0.014
(0.15)
0.046
(0.43)
0.265**
(2.20)
-0.027
(-0.19)-0.0004
(0.15)
-0.176
(1.54)
-0.034
(0.35)
0.001
(0.37)
-0.031*
(2.84)
-0.018
(1.00)
0.249
(1.12)
-0.369*
(2.74)
-0.004
(0.32)
0.046*
(2.24)
-0.623*
(1.73)
-0.270*
(2.40)
.
.
.
.
.
.
N
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments   
F-Test of excluded instruments (p-value)
Overidentification test (p-value)155
.
.
.155
0.083
0.0596
0.418Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Specification 1 controls for caste and block fixed effects and 
may  be  compared  with  the  various  specifications  reported  in  Table  9.  Specification  2  is  estimated  using  linear  
probability models, it relies number of living sons, number of living daughters, nuclear family and caste as instruments. 
It may be compared with estimates reported in Table 9, specification 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
